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INTERNATIONAL LAWLESSNESS, INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
AND THE PROBLEM OF TERRORISM: A CONUNDRUM OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
UPENDRA D. ACHARYA*
INTRODUCTION
At the dawn of the 21st century, the world was (as it is today) in
the process of working out the power dynamics that would shape this
coming century. China, India, Brazil, and many other countries have
demonstrated that they are financially and politically stable enough not
to be dictated to by the so-called powerful countries. At this time, the
United States continues to face the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001 in New York, Washington D.C., and Pennsylvania.
Now the world has begun to analyze whether it should allow the United
States' 20th century power monopoly to continue. Will the United
States lose its unilateral power base in the 21st century as Great
Britain did in the 19th century and continental Europe did in the 18th
century? What is the impact that the war on terror has or will have in
terms of the sustainability of the power monopoly of the United States?
These questions are appropriate this year as the United States and the
world community observe the consequences of the decade-long global
war on terror that followed the September 11th, terrorist attacks. Since
9/11, many foreign policy practitioners and international legal scholars
delivered their perspectives and claim that the event changed the
world, the understanding of international law, and the modus operandi
and dynamics of international relations. There is also a contrary view
that U.S. foreign policy and the approach to international law in that
foreign policy has not been world changing. The United States
continues to practice the same foreign policy that it did before 9/11, an
approach that did not change even after the Bush presidency.' The
purpose of this article is to address the 21st century world and what
* Assistant Professor, Gonzaga University School of Law. I am honored to
contribute to the celebration of the Journal's 40th Anniversary Festschrift in Honor of
Professor Ved Nanda. I would like to express my thanks to Professor Gerry Hess,
Attorney Jeannie Young and Professor Amy Kelly for their valuable insights. I also am
thankful to my research assistant, Jessica Campbell, for her hard work, insight and
support.
1. See Melvyn P. Leffler, 9/11 in Retrospect: George W. Bush's Grand Strategy,
Reconsidered, FOREIGN AFF., Sept/Oct. 2011, at 33, 33.
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place international law should have in international relations and in
U.S. foreign policy. In addressing this conundrum, the article will
explore the effects of the global war on terror on international law and
U.S. foreign policy, what has resulted from these developments, and
what, if anything, should be done to eliminate or reduce any negative
consequences.
GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR, OR WAR WITH AL QAEDA
On September 11, 2001 members of al Qaeda hijacked four U.S.
commercial aircrafts en route to California from the East Coast. 2 The al
Qaeda members threatened the passengers and attacked the
crewmembers, then redirected the aircrafts to New York and
Washington D.C. and used the aircrafts as weapons to attack the
United States causing the deaths of 2,973 innocent people.3  On the
evening of September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush, in an
address to the nation stated:
The search is underway for those who are behind these
evil acts. I've directed the full resources of our intelligence
and law enforcement communities to find those responsible
and to bring them to justice. We will make no distinction
between the terrorists who committed these acts and those
who harbor them. 4
On September 20, 2001, in a speech to a joint session of Congress,
President Bush announced that the hijackers were part of an anti-
American radical Muslim network known as al Qaeda and whose leader
was Osama Bin Laden.5 President Bush also accused the Taliban
government of Afghanistan of sheltering and supplying terrorists, he
demanded that the Taliban government hand over al Qaeda leaders to
the United States immediately or share the consequences.6 President
2. See NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE
UNITED STATES 2 4 (2004), [hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT], available at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/pdf/fullreport.pdf.
3. See id. at 4-14 for a detailed account of the attacks. 9/11 causalities: 2,749 people
were killed at the World Trade Center, 184 people were killed in the Pentagon, and 40
passengers died in rural Pennsylvania. Those figures do not include the terrorists. Id. at
311 n.188.
4. George W. Bush, President of the U.S., Address to the Nation in Light of the
Terrorist Attacks of September 11 (Sept. 11, 2001), available at http://www.national
center.org/BushGW9llOlAddress.html.
5. See George W. Bush, President of the U.S., Address to a Joint Session of Congress
(Sept. 20, 2001), [herein after Bush, Joint Session], available at http://articles.cnn.com/
2001-09-20/us/gen.bush.transcript 1 joint-session-national-anthem-citizens?_s=PM:US.
6. See id. ("[The terrorists] are recruited from their own nations and neighborhoods
and brought to camps in places like Afghanistan where they are trained in the tactics of
terror. They are sent back to their homes or sent to hide in countries around the world to
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Bush announced the beginning of the global war on terrorism as
follows:
We will direct every resource at our command-every
means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every
instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence,
and every necessary weapon of war - to the disruption and
to the defeat of the global terror network. . . . We will
starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another,
drive them from place to place, until there is no refuge or
no rest. And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe
haven to terrorism. Every nation in every region, now has a
decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with
the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that
continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded
by the United States as a hostile regime.7
Further, President Bush stated in his 2004 State of the Union
Address to Congress, justifying the global war on terror, "[aifter the
chaos and carnage of September the 11th, it is not enough to serve our
enemies with legal papers. The terrorists and their supporters declared
war on the United States. And war is what they got."8
The United States invaded Afghanistan to hunt down terrorists
shortly after 9/11. Then in 2003, the global war enterprise extended to
Iraq. The United States led a "coalition of the willing" to topple
Saddam Hussein's government, but never found the weapons of mass
destruction President Bush had claimed were there. 9 Despite the
United States' efforts to bring peace and democracy to these countries,
Iraq and Afghanistan are still in chaos a decade later. 10
When President Barack Obama took office, the new administration
dropped the term "war on terror" and replaced it with "war with al
plot evil and destruction. The leadership of al Qaeda has great influence in Afghanistan
and supports the Taliban regime in controlling most of that country. . . . The Taliban must
act and act immediately. They will hand over the terrorists or they will share in their
fate.").
7. Id.
8. George W. Bush, President of the U.S., 2004 State of the Union Address (Jan. 20,
2004) [hereinafter Bush, 2004 State of the Union], available at http://www.washington
post.com/wp-srv/politics/transcripts/bushtext_012004.html.
9. See US Invasion of Iraq 'inevitable,' BBC NEWS, Mar. 18, 2003,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilmiddle east/2862273.stm.
10. See Dan Zak & Asaad Majeed, Iraq Bombings Kill, Injure Dozens, SAN FRANCISCO
CHRONICLE, Oct. 13, 2011, at A5, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?f=/ca/2011/10/12/MN161LGVPM.DTL; Afghanistan: Recent Developments,




Qaeda and its affiliates."" This transformation of "Global War on
Terror" to "War with al Qaeda" seemed to change the legal framework
of the war and make it more limited; however, in reality, Obama's
foreign policies are not significantly different from Bush's - the "War
with al Qaeda" is still a global war. 1 2 There was an expectation that
Obama would adopt an approach based on reasoned judgment rather
than a dogmatic ideology, and would dismiss Bush's black-and-white
policy of war on terror (either you're with us or against us). 1 3 Instead,
Obama kept the Bush administration's surveillance program intact, the
Patriot Act remained on the books, the authority to use rendition
continued, the Military Commission was preserved (albeit with more
procedural safeguards), the number of unmanned drone strikes
increased at suspected terrorist hideouts along the Pakistan-
Afghanistan border and in Pakistan (the strikes are suspect from an
international law viewpoint and also could be strategically dangerous),
and troop levels in Afghanistan were tripled (immediately after Obama
received the Nobel Peace Prize).14 Obama banned the use of
waterboarding, but refused to release photographs showing abuse of
detainees and a memo about C.I.A. interrogation techniques.15 Finally,
President Obama re-declared that "[olur nation is at war" after the
Detroit terrorist attempt.16 The Economist did not hesitate to declare
President Obama "[a]nother war president, after all."" The global war
on terror continues: Afghanistan and Iraq are still occupied by U.S.
troops, and, moreover, the war is expanding into other states including
Pakistan,'8 Yemen,' 9 and Somalia 20 through the use of unmanned
drones.
11. Ved P. Nanda, Introductory Essay: International Law Implications of The United
States "War On Terror," 37 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 513, 514 (2009) [hereinafter Nanda,
"War on Terror'" (citing Sue Pleming, Obama Team Drops "War On Terror" Rhetoric,
REUTERS, Mar. 31, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/politicsNews/
idUSTRE52T7MH20090330).
12. Id. at 515 (noting that the "[Global War on Terror] raised questions about the
administration's real-contrasted with its professed-commitment to faithfully adhere to
the rule of law."); Peter Baker, Obama's War Over Terror, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Jan. 6,
2010, at 6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/17/magazine/17Terror-t.htm ("I
don't think it's even fair to call it Bush Lite . . . . It's Bush. It's really, really hard to find a
difference that's meaningful and not atmospheric. You see a lot of straining on things
trying to make things look repackaged, but they're really not that different.").
13. See Baker, supra note 12, at 2.
14. Id. at 5.
15. Id. at 3, 6.
16. Id. at 9.
17. See Barack Obama and terrorism: Another war president, after all, THE
ECONOMIST, Jan. 7, 2010, available at http://www.economist.com/node/15213339.
18. Jane Perlez & Ismail Khan, Deadly Drone Strike by U.S. May Fuel Anger in
Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/23/
world/asia/23pakistan.html.
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The war on terror has become global in other ways as well. The
United States is no longer the only state fighting a war against
terrorism; other states are employing U.S.-style tactics against their
own "terrorists." Instead of using international legal mechanisms for
dealing with conflict, some states are taking politically driven
unilateral action to suppress dissention within their own states in the
name of fighting terrorism. China, for example, has been accused of
"opportunistically using the post-September 11 environment to make
the outrageous claim that [Muslim Uighurs] in Xinjiang are terrorists"
in order to suppress the Uighurs' religious activities and condemn them
as illegal. 21 Russia's struggle to control separatists in Chechnya also
turned into part of the war on terror after 2001, allowing Putin to
justify his use of force, human rights violations, and Geneva Convention
violations as a necessary part of the global war on terror. 22 Taking a
non-legal political approach instead of relying on lawful means of
conflict resolution as these countries are doing in following the U.S.
approach is threatening to create an anarchistic world order and
contributing to global disorder and chaos.
CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR ON TERROR
The global war on terror has raised concerns and issues in many
areas of international law and international affairs. These include
questions regarding the use of force, human rights, international
humanitarian law, irregular rendition, torture, the fate of Afghanistan
and other countries that are directly or indirectly said to be connected
with terrorism, the legality of the United States military campaign, and
the extraterritorial reach of individual nations or groups of nations in
securing peace and security in the world. 23 In all of these areas, the
international rule of law has been disregarded or violated.
The U.S. War on Terror undermined different rubrics of
international law, making international law a primary victim of the
19. David S. Cloud, Jeffrey Fleishman, & Brian Bennett, U.S. drone strike in Yemen
kills U.S.-born Al Qaeda figure Awlaki, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2011), available at
http://articles.1atimes.com/2011/oct/01/world/la-fg-awlaki-killed-20111001.
20. Greg Jaffe & Karen DeYoung, U.S. Drone Targets Two Leaders of Somali Group
Allied With Al-Qaeda, Official Says, WASH. PoST (June 29, 2011), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/national-security/us-drones-target-two-leaders-
of-somali-group-allied-with-al-qaeda/2011/06/29/AGJFxZrH story.html.
21. China 'crushing Muslim Uighurs,' BBC NEWS, Apr. 12, 2005, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4435135.stm.
22. Colonel James P. Terry, Moscow's Corruption Of The Law Of Armed Conflict:
Important Lessons For The 21st Century, 53 NAVAL L. REV. 73, 205 (2006) ("The Putin
government seized upon the September 11, 2001, attacks by al Qaeda as an opportunity to
recast the war in Chechnya as a 'counter-terrorist operation."').




war. The already questionable status of international law incurred
further distrust. First, the war on terror made provisions of the UN
Charter confusing with regard to the legality of the use of force. It is
clear that, after 9/11 the problem of terrorism was not addressed
through the rules of international criminal law as that law is outlined
in the UN Charter and a majority of treaties and resolutions. 24 The
Bush administration never bothered to determine whether an act of
terrorism constitutes an act of aggression in breach of Article 2(4)
justifying an armed response in self-defense within the scope of Article
51 of the UN Charter 25 or whether an act of terrorism constitutes an act
of aggression in breach of international peace and security that justifies
a collective security approach by the Security Council under Chapter
VII of the UN Charter. 26 There are three primary sections contained in
the Charter of the United Nations that govern the use of force against
Member States.27 First, Article 2(4) of the Charter provides a blanket
mandate against the use of force "in any manner inconsistent with the
purposes of the United Nations." 28  Second, Article 51 of the UN
Charter is the initial legal structure for self-defense when an armed
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations. 29  Third,
Chapter VII of the UN Charter empowers the Security Council to take
those actions necessary to maintain international peace and security.30
The post-9/11 War on Terror has made international law a quiet
observer by undermining majority resolutions and treaties related to
terrorism and Articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter.31 Previously,
Article 2(4) was limited to state actors; however, after 9/11, a tacit
interpretation was advanced that not only state actors but also non-
24. See Upendra D. Acharya, War On Terror Or Terror Wars: The Problem In
Defining Terrorism, 37 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 653, 664-68 (2009) [hereinafter Acharya,
Terror) (providing a detailed analysis of Security Council and General Assembly
Resolutions and major treaties suggesting that terrorism should be treated as an act of
crime rather than an act of war).
25. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 ("All Members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations."); U.N. Charter art. 51 ("Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations. . . .").
26. See U.N. Charter arts. 39-45.
27. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4, arts. 39-45, 51.
28. Id. art. 2, para. 4. This article expressly indicates that a state is prohibited to use
force against another state, it does not bring non-state actors within the scope of this
article.
29. Id. art. 51.
30. Id. arts. 39-45.
31. See Acharya, Terror, supra note 24, at 664-68; U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4, art.
51.
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state actors can violate Article 2(4).32 The entire international
community rushed to endorse the use of self-defense as a justification of
the United States' actions against al Qaeda, a non-state actor, in
Afghanistan, which in turn eviscerated the thrust of Article 2(4).33
Further, the doctrine of self-defense against the attack by a state under
Article 51 of the UN Charter was distorted when the United States
included Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq in the war on terror and
invaded Iraq, giving birth to the concept of preventive self-defense. 34
Now force could be used where a state or non-state actor is believed to
have plans for an attack, based solely on the unilateral prediction of the
country using force that an attack may occur in the near or remote
future - even though that prediction may be baseless. 35 Furthermore,
Chapter VII of the UN Charter was violated as well, because the United
States usurped the power and authority of the UN Security Council by
acting unilaterally rather than bringing the pursuit of the 9/11 attack
organizers before the Council for lawful, collective action. 36 On the one
hand, the United States declared a global war on terror and made 9/11
a global issue by claiming that the attack breached international peace
and security and, on the other, it acted in collective self-defense without
letting the Security Council act on the matter of the threat to or breach
of international peace and security. This further eroded the legitimacy
of the Security Council and of international law.
32. See Acharya, Terror, supra note 24, at 676, for a detailed description of the re-
interpretation of U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4; see also YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR,
AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 207-08 (4th ed. 2005); Colonel Kenneth Watkin,
Canada/United States Military Interoperability and Humanitarian Law Issues: Land
Mines, Terrorism, Military Objectives and Targeted Killing, 15 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L.
281, 293 n.54 (2005).
33. See DINSTEIN, supra note 32, at 207-08.
34. U.N. Charter art. 51; see GEORGE W. BUSH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 15 (2002), available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/
military/library/policy/national/nss-020920.pdf ("The greater the threat, the greater is the
risk of inaction-and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend
ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. To
forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if
necessary, act preemptively in an age where the enemies of civilization openly and
actively seek the world's most destructive technologies, the United States cannot remain
idle while dangers gather.").
35. See Leffler, supra note 1, at 40, for a historical perspective on the United States
and preventative foreign policies.
36. Acharya, Terror, supra note 24, at 676-77; see U.N. Charter, arts. 39-45; see also
UN Charter art. 51 ("Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-
defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way
affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter
to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore
international peace and security."); see also Bush, 2004 State of the Union, supra note 8
("America will never seek a permission slip to defend the security of our country.").
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In the process of fighting the Global War on Terror, the Bush
administration focused not only on al Qaeda, but also on terrorist
threats generally and on the regimes alleged to harbor terrorists. In
order to gather intelligence, the United States resorted to the indefinite
detention of terror suspects without charging them or giving them a
trial, irregular rendition, torture, and in many cases, the killing of
civilians, forsaking basic human rights and violating international
humanitarian laws.
The military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq caused the deaths
of thousands of innocent civilians, frequently in violation of the Geneva
Convention Protocol on the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts. 3 7 In the past 10 years, at least 137,000 civilians were
killed in Iraq and Afghanistan. 38 When U.S. AC-130 gunships strafed
the farming village of Chowkar-Karez, 25 miles north of Kandahar,
Afghanistan on October 22 and 23 2001, killing at least 93 civilians, a
Pentagon official said, "[T]he people there are dead because we wanted
them dead."39  The reason? The villagers sympathized with the
Taliban. 4 0  In two accidental air bombings of villages in eastern
Afghanistan resulting in the deaths of 17 people, 15 of them children,
the United States neither apologized nor offered compensation. 41 In the
infamous Haditha killings of November 2005, U.S. Marines shot and
killed 24 Iraqis, including 15 innocent civilians, and then tried to cover
up the incident by filing a false report which stated that the civilians
37. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 48, Dec. 12,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 ("In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian
population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish
between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military
objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives.").
38. Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Price of 9/11, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Sept. 1, 2011),
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/stiglitzl42/English.
39. Marc W. Herold, A Dossier on Civilian Victims of United States' Aerial Bombing
of Afghanistan: A Comprehensive Accounting, CURSOR (Mar. 2002),
http://cursor.org/stories/civiliandeaths.htm; Murray Campbell, Bombing of Farming
Village Undermines U.S Credibility, TORONTO GLOBE & MAIL (Nov. 3, 2001); see also
Merciless U.S Bombing Obliterates Village: 60 Killed, DAWN (Nov. 2, 2001),
http://archives.dawn.com/2001/11/02/intl0.htm. For more on civilian deaths in
Afghanistan, see Faiz Ahmed, Afghanistan's Reconstruction, Five Years Later: Narratives
of Progress, Marginalized Realities, and the Politics of Law in a Transitional Islamic
Republic, 10 GONZ. J. INT'L L. 269, 279 (2007); Afghanistan's Civilian Deaths Mount, BBC
NEWS (Jan. 3, 2002), available at http:// news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilsouthasia/1740538.stm
("The number of Afghan civilians killed by US bombs has surpassed the death toll of the
11 September attacks ... nearly 3,800 Afghans died between 7 October and 7 December
[2001].").
40. Herold, supra note 39.
41. Ahmed, supra note 39, at 280 n.29 (citing Ahmed Rashid, The Mess in
Afghanistan, THE NEW YORK REVIEW 27 (Feb. 12, 2004)).
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were killed in a roadside bombing, clearly violating customary
international law concerning civilian causalities.42
In addition to the killing of innocent civilians, the War on Terror
under the Bush administration ignored the rights of captured terror
suspects as well. First, by defining them as "unlawful enemy
combatants," which is not a term mentioned in the Geneva Convention
or in other treaties concerning the laws of war, the United States
government could legally justify not allowing detainees basic rights
afforded to prisoners of war under international law.4 3 "Unlawful
enemy combatants" were subject to torture, abuse, and humiliation at
Abu Ghraib and other prisons in Iraq44 and habeas corpus violations at
Guantanamo Bay. 4 5 In a series of recent cases, the United States
Supreme Court attempted to stop the unlawful deprivation of rights
taking place at Guantanamo Bay by holding that the statutory and
constitutional right to habeas corpus review apply at Guantanamo. 46 In
42. Melissa Epstein Mills, Brass-Collar Crime: A Corporate Model For Command
Responsibility, 47 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 25, 39 (2010); see also Colin H. Kahl, How We
Fight, FOREIGN AFF., Nov./DEC. 2006, at 83, 83-84 (explaining that the attack violated
internationally recognized legal principles regarding civilian casualties, as only
acceptable as a "byproduct of attacks on legitimate military targets" not exceeding "the
anticipated military benefit."); see also Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
43. See Leila Nadya Sadat, A Presumption of Guilt: the Unlawful Enemy Combatant
and the U.S. War on Terror, 37 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 539, 539 (2009) ("[B]ecause
terrorists are so-called 'unlawful enemy combatants,' they were not entitled to the
protections of the laws of war as regards their detention and treatment"); Military
Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2601, available at
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military Law/pdf/PL-109-366.pdf ("The term 'unlawful enemy
combatant' means-(i) a person who has engaged in hostilities or who has purposefully
and materially supported hostilities against the United States or its co-belligerents who is
not a lawful enemy combatant [including a person who is part of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or
associated forces]"); Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316.
44. See ANTONIO M. TAGUBA, U.S. ARMY, ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE 800TH
MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE 16 (2004), available at http://www.npr.org/iraq/2004/prison-
abuse-report.pdf ("between October and December 2003, at the Abu Ghraib Confinement
Facility (BCCF), numerous incidents of sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal abuses
were inflicted on several detainees."); Iraq Torture 'Worse after Saddam, BBC NEWS
(Sept. 21, 2006), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hil5368360.stm.
45. See e.g., Nick Childs, Guantanamo Controversy Rumbles On, BBC NEWS (Oct. 4,
2004), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilamericas/3754238.stm; Kenneth Roth, After
Guantanamo, The Case Against Preventive Detention, FOREIGN AFF., MAY/JUNE 2008, at
9, 11-12 ("The White House claims that it is waging a 'global war on terrorism' and that
terrorism suspects worldwide with alleged connections to al Qaeda can thus be arrested
as combatants. But since this 'war' knows no geographic or temporal bounds, it has
become increasingly controversial as a continuing basis for detention, especially because
many of the Guantanamo detainees were arrested far from any recognizable battlefield.").
46. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (holding that federal habeas statute conferred
on district court jurisdiction to hear challenges of aliens held at Guantanamo Bay);
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (holding that due process required that United
152 VOL. 40:1-3
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response, Congress took counter-actions to deprive United States courts
of their jurisdiction over detainees at Guantanamo Bay, giving the
President control over detainees through the use of military tribunals
and limited review of detention. 47
When President Obama took office in 2008, he made some changes
to the Bush detainee policies to conform them to international law. In
2009, President Obama announced he would close Guantanamo Bay in
one year.48 He also ordered that prisoners be treated according to the
mandates of the Geneva Convention and ordered immediate review of
the status of each detainee. 49 Despite these initial steps taken to
restore human rights to detainees (though Guantanamo Bay still has
not been closed), Obama's policies are still "fundamentally consistent
with the positions of the prior administration," especially with regard to
detention of suspected terrorists.50
CONSEQUENCES TO THE UNITED STATES
After 9/11, the United States made Afghanistan and Iraq its
concerted focus and drained its financial and leadership capital on these
two countries in the name of the war on terror. Many scholars argue
that the start of the War on Terror marked the beginning of the decline
of American world dominance. 51
States citizen being held as enemy combatant be given meaningful opportunity to contest
factual basis for his detention); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (holding that
the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) did not deprive Supreme Court of jurisdiction over
habeas appeal, pending at time of DTA's enactment, by alien detained by Department of
Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (holding
that the habeas corpus privilege and Suspension Clause provided in the United States
Constitution applied to detainees held at Guantanamo Bay).
47. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005, 119 Stat. 2739,
2742 (2005) ("no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to consider an
application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba . . ."); Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, §
5, 120 Stat. 2600, 2631 (2006), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military-Law/pdf/PL-
109-366.pdf ("No person may invoke the Geneva Conventions or any protocols thereto in
any habeas corpus or other civil action or proceeding to which the United States, or a
current or former officer, employee, member of the Armed Forces, or other agent of the
United States is a party as a source of rights in any court of the United States or its
States or territories.").
48. Nanda, "War on Terror," supra note 11, at 516.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 519 (quoting Steven A. Engel, senior attorney for the Bush Administration's
Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel, in William Glaberson, U.S. Won't Label
Terror Suspects as 'Combatants,' N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2009, at Al.
51. See Malcon Fraser, America's Self-Inflicted Decline, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Aug. 30,
2011), http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/fraser2/English ("America's
leadership in world affairs began to weaken with the unilateralism of Bush, and today's
economic problems are reinforcing this tendency."); but see Fareed Zakaria, The Future of
American Power: How America Can Survive the Rise of the Rest, FOREIGN AFF., May/June
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The War on Terror took a huge economic toll on the United States.
According to the Congressional Research Service, as of March 2011 the
United States Congress had approved a total of $1.283 trillion dollars of
funding for military operations, base security, reconstruction, foreign
aid, embassy costs, and veterans' health care in Afghanistan and Iraq,
and for other War on Terror operations since 9/11.52 Military spending
now nearly equals that of the rest of the world combined. 53 The U.S.
budget, which had surplus of $128 billion, was drastically reversed to a
deficit of $458 billion. 5 4 Federal debt as a percentage of GDP rose from
32.5 percent in 2001 to 53.5 percent in 2009.55 Now the United States is
in a financial crisis at home, while its financial strength and dominance
internationally has been seriously weakened, opening the door for
emerging nations like China to step up.56
The War on Terror has also taken a serious toll on the reputation of
the United States abroad. The Abu Ghraib abuse scandal, the use of
torture, extraordinary rendition, deprivation of habeas corpus rights,
and indiscriminate killings of civilians hurt the "moral authority" of the
United States.57 President Bush's "you are either with us or against us"
foreign policy and disregard for the United Nations Charter and other
international laws succeeded only in alienating potential allies.
Although that kind of unilateral action may have worked a decade or
two ago, when there existed a unipolar world in which the United
States was dominant, it does not work well in the 21st century
multipolar or nonpolar world, where the United States is not the only
2008, at 18, 19 (proposing that though America has a "dysfunctional" political system, its
"society is vibrant" and its economy "remains fundamentally vigorous when compared
with others.").
52. AMY BELASCO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33110, THE COST OF IRAQ,
AFGHANISTAN, AND OTHER GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR OPERATIONS SINCE 9/11, ii (2011),
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33110.pdf; see id. at 1-5, for a breakdown
of the costs by operation and agency; see also id. at 10 (estimating the approved budget to
reach $1.4 trillion in 2012); see also Leffler, supra note 1, at 37-38 (noting that defense
spending went from $304 billion in 2001 to $616 billion in 2008); Stiglitz, supra note 38
(estimating total War on Terror expenditures to be closer to $2 trillion and to reach $3
trillion by the time all the bills are paid for).
53. Stiglitz, supra note 38.
54. Leffler, supra note 1, at 38.
55. Id.
56. Gideon Rachman, Think Again: American Decline, FOREIGN POL'Y (Jan. 2, 2011),
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/01/02/think-again-american decline ("China's
economic prowess is already allowing Beijing to challenge American influence all over the
world.").
57. Stiglitz, supra note 38 ("America's real strength . . is its "soft power," its moral
authority. And this, too, was weakened: as the US violated basic human rights like
habeas corpus and the right not to be tortured . . . "); see also Kahl, supra note 42, at 84
(describing a survey which showed that citizens from many other states "felt that the
United States 'didn't try very hard' to avoid civilian causalities in Iraq.").
VOL. 40:1-3154
INTERNATIONAL LAWLESSNESS
center of power.5 Because of these factors, the United States must now
make extra efforts to convince the world that it still has due regard for
international law and can still act collectively with others.
The War on Terror may have also weakened the United States' own
security and perpetuated an "endless" war on terror. Animosity toward
the United States resulting from military invasions and occupations,
use of torture and detention, killing of innocent civilians, bombing
villages and homes, and the undercurrent of religious warfare, actually
helped terrorist recruiters create more terrorists.59 Once the War on
Terror began, the incidences of terrorism in fact increased, as
presumably did the number of terrorists.60 A 2008 report from the
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, an independent non-
partisan think tank, states:
While the United States and its partners in the war on
terrorism have made important strides in combating jihadi
groups worldwide since September 11th, they have not
weakened the jihadis' will or their ability to inspire and
regenerate. . . . Since 2002-2003, however, the overall US
position in the [Global War on Terror] has slipped. To be
sure, the United States has made considerable progress . .
. Those gains, however, have been offset by the metastasis
of the al Qaeda organization into a global movement, the
spread and intensification of Salafi-Jihadi ideology, the
resurgence of Iranian regional influence, and the growth in
number and political influence of Islamic fundamentalist
political parties throughout the world. Both Salafi-Jihadi
and Khomeinist branches of Islamic radicalism have
spread rather than receded since 2003. The continued
presence of US military forces in Iraq has been a boon for
the jihadi movement's propaganda effort and bolstered the
legitimacy of its call to defensive jihad.6
Though the recent deaths of Osama bin Laden and several other
high-ranking al Qaeda officials have been a positive development for
the War on Terror and its reputation, the overreaction to 9/11 and
consequences of the War on Terror to the United States and to the
58. Bush says it is time for action, CNN.COM (Nov. 6, 2001), http://edition.cnn.com/
2001/US/1 1/06/ret.bush.coalition/index.html; see Richard Haass, The Age of Nonpolarity:
What Will Follow U.S. Dominance, FOREIGN AFF., May/June 2008, at 44, 44-45, 51-53.
"The United States will no longer have the luxury of a 'You're either with us or against us'
foreign policy." Id. at 56.
59. Roth, supra note 45, at 16 (arguing that detention begets more detainees).
60. Leffler, supra note 1, at 39.
61. ROBERT C. MARTINAGE, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT, THE
GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM: AN ASSESSMENT 5-6 (2008), available at http://www.csba
online.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/2008.02.23-The-Global-War-on-Terrorism.pdf.
2012 155
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
world have arguably far outweighed the atrocities committed on 9/11
and the progress of the United States thus far in defeating terrorism.
This begs the question: who won the Global War on Terror - al Qaeda
or the United States? 62 Did the United States take the right approach
toward defeating terrorism? Or perhaps the question should be: can
terrorism be defeated at all?63 To what extent has international law
been accommodated in dealing with the problem of terrorism? Can a
power (realist) approach resolve this problem? Or do we need to employ
legal methods or force of law to address this problem?
U.S. HEGEMONY: IR THEORY AND PASSIVE APPROACH OF INTERNATIONAL
LEGALISTS
The declaration of the global war on terror and the political and
legal tactics used in support of it have resulted in skepticism regarding
the continuation of the leadership of the United States in world affairs.
Why did the United States take such a risk to its status in dealing with
the problem of terrorism? There may be several known and unknown
reasons and answers to this question. One of the answers may be that
the United States engaged in a short-term political fix to serve the
existing power base of governing elites. 64 In other words, U.S. strategy
was dominated by a realist approach that unduly minimized the use of
international law in international relations and in U.S. foreign policy.
What the realist approach does is kill the operational role of
international law in international behavior. When a country does not
allow existing international standards to play their operational roles in
addressing terrorism and other international problems, it drags itself
into a long-term process that peels away its power and authority.
Afghanistan and Iraq are such examples of the effects of the failure of
the United States to follow international legal standards in its foreign
policy. Realists imagined a weeklong military campaign to defeat al
Qaeda in Afghanistan (an already failed state) and, in the name of the
war on terror, the U.S. extended its military reach into Iraq where the
suppression of terrorism remains a dream that has been chased for a
decade. The situations in Afghanistan and Iraq developed because
realists never believed that international law was really law that could
be a useful tool to resolve the problem of terrorism.
62. See William McCants, Al Qaeda's Challenge: The Jihadists' War With Islamist
Democrats, FOREIGN AFF., Sept/Oct. 2011, at 20, for a history of Al Qaeda and bin Laden
and their goals.
63. See Haass, supra note 58, at 53 ("Terrorism, like disease, cannot be eradicated. .
The goal should be to reduce the impact of even successful attacks."). I propose that
though terrorism may be a disease; it can still be treated with legal tools and judicial
means.
64. See Leffler, supra note 1, at 37, 41.
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The question of whether international law is really law is not
new. 6 5 However, the question of what relevance or force international
law can have in shaping states' behavior in international affairs has
received little attention.66 Now is the time to consider more deeply the
question of the relevance and force of international law in addressing
the problem of terrorism and its effects in other areas of international
law and international relations. The question of the reality of
international law is no longer a subject of discussion because of the
existence of a large body of international laws, organizations to
administer international laws, and the reliance of nations on
international laws to either legitimize their actions or enhance their
positions in international negotiations. However, the relevance and
force of international law is still an important question. In order to
address this issue, we need to ponder whether we want to legalize
international politics or politicize international law. The answer to this
question will reveal how the international community will address
terrorism and problems associated with it. The question of whether
international politics should be legalized or whether international law
should be politicized explores the law and non-law nature of
international law in the context of compliance and enforcement. There
are scholars who like to believe that international law in fact matters
and that nations comply with it.67 Other scholars argue that
65. See Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J.
2599 (1997), for a detailed discussion on why nations obey international law. Professor
Koh has discussed and analyzed international political and relation theorists and
international legal scholars including Hans Morgenthau, Louis Henkin, Abram Chayes &
Antonia Handler Chayes, Oran Young, Thomas M. Franck and many other scholars. He
describes obedience of international law from ancient and primitive international law to
modern institutional era and post-cold war era of international law. He has mainly
focused on the compliance issue of international law analyzing managerial approach of
Chayes and fairness approach of Franck and has argued that "richness of transnational
legal process can provide the key to unlocking the ancient puzzle of why nations obey."
However, he does not address the issue of international power politics that has been a
major obstacle to the structure, function and thus perception of international law.
66. See Francis A. Boyle, The Irrelevance of International Law: The Schism Between
International Law and International Politics, 10 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 193 (1980). The author
has analyzed the claim of international politicians that international law is essentially
irrelevant in addressing international problems due to vital national interests and has
suggested that emergence of international organizations might lead to the path where
international law can become relevant in addressing the international problems. He
demonstrates his thesis 'the relevance of international law' by quoting Morgenthau: "[I]n
a world of nuclear weapons systems developed to the current level of technical expertise
where the instantaneous destruction of mankind is imminently possible, power politics as
a principle for the conduct of international relations has become fatally defective and
could ultimately result in the destruction of the human race ..... Id. at 217.
67. See LOUis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 47 (2d ed.
1979) (asserting that "almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law
and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time"); see also THOMAS M. FRANCK,
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international law does not matter at all,68 or, matters only when it
serves the interests of the nations concerned in the given
circumstances. 6 9  These divided viewpoints regarding the role of
international law in resolving international problems represent various
spectrums of international relations theorists and international legal
scholars. While the divisions among international relations theorists
and international legal scholars are pertinent, Professor Christopher C.
Joyner claims that the divided groups of scholars share a "dirty little
secret" and further explains: "both groups know that the presence of
international law is critical for international relations to occur, and
both know that the practice of international politics is essential for
international law to evolve and function. But each is still reluctant to
admit the necessity of the other."70 Although both groups share a "dirty
little secret," the realist approach of international theory has dominated
U.S. policy on the war on terror. The realist approach believes that
international relations are governed by a selfish lust for power that
defines interests setting the standard that directs political actions and
that universal moral principles are only a pretext for the pursuit of
national politics where state is the unitary actor.71 For the realists,
international politics is a struggle for power where one state is able to
control and influence another state's behavior to serve the interests of
the more powerful state. 72 Realists believe that maximizing political
THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 25 (1990); Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in
the International System, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 705 (1988); Oscar Schachter, Dag
Hammarskjold and the Relation of Law to Politics, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 2-3 (1962).
68. See Charles Krauthammer, The Curse of Legalism: International Law? It's Purely
Advisory, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 6, 1989, at 44. The author dismisses the concept of
international law and says international law may be used after the political action of a
nation for retroactive legal justification. He states:
Legalism starts with a naive belief in the efficacy of law as a regulator of
international conduct. [I]nternational relations is not contract law. And
treaties are not retained simply because their provisions are fully observed or
renounced simply because they are breached. One has to make a larger judgment.
. . That is a policy judgment to which a reading of treaty text, no matter how
close, contributes nothing.. . . [I]nternational law-is an ass.
Id. at 44, 50. This is purely a realist approach to the conduct of international relations.
69. Koh, supra note 65, at 2611 (noting that legal scholars of the Hobbesian
Rationalist approach follow the theory that nations sometimes follow international law
when it serves their self-interests.); see also Kenneth W. Abbott, Elements of a Joint
Discipline, International Law and International Relations Theory: Building Bridges, 86
AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 167, 169-70 (1992); Boyle, supra note 66, at 210-11; Robert
Kaufman, Morgenthau's Unrealistic Realism, 1 YALE J. INT'L AFF. 24, 29 (2006); John K.
Setear, An Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of International Relations Theory
and International Law, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 139, 142-47 (1996).
70. Christopher C. Joyner, International Law Is, as International Relations Theory
Does?, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 248, 248 (2006) (book review).
71. Kaufman, supra note 69, at 24-29.
72. Joyner, supra note 70, at 251.
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advantage rather than justice, morality, or law will prevail in
international politics.7 3 According to the realists, in a global condition
where there is no superior authority, sovereign states are the only
supreme authorities and they must act rationally and their rational
actions are lawful when those actions maximize their political,
economic, and security interests. 74 Basically the realists believe that
"international law-is an ass." 75
There are other approaches in international relations theory that
soften the harshness of the realist approach, but do not distance
themselves from its substance. International legal scholars like to
celebrate the recognition of international law by reference to
international relations theory within the sphere of these less harsh
approaches. The constructivist approach is one of a few other
approaches in which international legal scholars find themselves
attached to international law. The constructivists argue that states and
their interests are socially constructed by "commonly held philosophic
principles, identities, norms of behavior, or shared terms of discourse." 76
Rather than arguing that state actors and interests create rules and
norms, constructivists contend that "[r]ules and norms constitute the
international game by determining who the actors are, what rules they
must follow if they wish to ensure that particular consequences follow
from specific acts, and how titles to possessions can be established and
transferred."7 7 Thus, constructivists see norms as playing a critical role
in the formation of national identities. Similarly, the liberal
approach,78 neo-liberal approach, 79 and institutionalist approach8 o have
73. Id.
74. Id. at 251-52. This realist approach can be called rational choice theory.
75. Krauthammer, supra note 68, at 50.
76. MARTHA FINNEMORE, NATIONAL INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 15 (1996).
For further information on constructivists see ALEXANDER WENDT, SOCIAL THEORY OF
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1999); Alexander Wendt, Collective Identity Formation and the
International State, 88 AM. POL. SCl. REV. 384 (1994); Alexander Wendt, Constructing
International Politics, INT'L SECURITY, Summer 1995, at 71. For a recent, systematic
treatment of norms from a constructivist perspective, see THE CULTURE OF NATIONAL
SECURITY: NORMS AND IDENTITY IN WORLD POLITICS (Peter J. Katzenstein ed., 1996).
77. NGAIRE WOODS, The Uses of Theory in the Study of International Relations, in
EXPLAINING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SINCE 1945 9, 26 (Ngaire Woods ed., 1996)
(emphasis omitted).
78. See Koh, supra note 65. Mr. Koh states "[t]he determinative factor for whether
nations obey can be found, not at a systemic level, but at the level of domestic structure.
Under this view, compliance depends significantly on whether or not the state can be
characterized as 'liberal' in identity, that is, having a form of representative government,
guarantees of civil and political rights, and a judicial system dedicated to the rule of law.
Flipping the now-familiar Kantian maxim that 'democracies don't fight one another,'
these theorists posit that liberal democracies are more likely to 'do law' with one another,
while relations between liberal and illiberal states will more likely transpire in a zone of
politics." Id. at 2633 (citing Anne-Marie Burley, Law Among Liberal States: Liberal
Internationalism and the Act of State Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1907, 1920-21 (1992);
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been identified by international legal scholars as justifications for
strengthening the place of international law in international politics.
On the one hand, the realists have undermined the role of
international law in international politics. On the other hand, the
constructivists, liberalists, neo-liberalists, and institutionalists have
softened their arguments regarding the roles of international law and
Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L.
503 (1995); Anne-Marie Slaughter & Alec Stone, Assessing the Effectiveness of
International Adjudication, 89 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 91, 91 (1995) (positing that
"[1]iberal states will rely more heavily on legal rules--such as those established by
treaties--to govern their relations, and they will more often rely on adjudication to resolve
disputes, both intergovernmental and transnational.")).
79. See S.G. Sreejith, Public International Law and the WTO: A Reckoning of Legal
Positivism and Neoliberalism, 9 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 5 (2007). Mr. Sreejith notes that
neoliberalism is a 'global policy regime that comprises free trade and the free flow of
resources via market mechanisms."' Id. at 47 (citing GEORGE DEMARTINO, GLOBAL
ECONOMY, GLOBAL JUSTICE: THEORETICAL OBJECTIONS AND POLICY ALTERNATIVES TO
NEOLIBERALISM 125 (2000)). He also notes "neoliberalism is considered the ideology of
the process of globalization. Such a view generally provides an economic logic which
justifies the emergence of a single global market and upholds the principle of global
competition." Id. at 46-47. Mr. Sreejith further states neoliberalism has brought
"multinational corporations, NGOs, and other agents of change--a forum built on the
principles of universalism, individualism, rational voluntaristic authority, progress, and
world citizenship. These institutions are imbued with neoliberal culture, concerns,
content, norms, and shape. Although they cannot claim to have totally taken over the
baton from the states, they lobby and criticize states, mobilize around and elaborate
global cultural principles, and convince states to act on those principles." Id. at 51 (citing
John Boli & George M. Thomas, World Culture in the World Polity: A Century of
International Non-Governmental Organization, 62 AM. Soc. REV. 171, 187 (1997)).
80. See ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE
WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 85-109 (1984); David J. Townsend, Stretching the Dispute
Settlement Understanding: U.S.-Cotton's Relaxed Interpretation of Cross-retaliation in
the World Trade Organization, 9 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 135, 160-61 (2010)
("Institutionalists emphasize that international organizations facilitate information
sharing, transparency and monitoring of compliance with obligations, and reducing but
not eliminating obstacles to cooperation posed by power disparities."); see also Robert 0.
Keohane & Lisa L. Martin, The Promise of Institutionalist Theory, INT'L SECURITY,
Summer 1995, at 39 (1995). Within the umbrella of this approach, scholars have
discussed regime theory and rationalism theory. For more information, see generally
ROBERT M. AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984); ROBERT 0. KEOHANE,
AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY
(1984); ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND STATE POWER: ESSAYS IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY (1989); ORAN R. YOUNG, COMPLIANCE AND PUBLIC
AUTHORITY: A THEORY WITH INTERNATIONAL APPLICATIONS (1979); ORAN R. YOUNG,
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: BUILDING REGIMES FOR NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE
ENVIRONMENT (1989); ORAN R. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE: PROTECTING THE
ENVIRONMENT IN A STATELESS SOCIETY (1994); Oran Young, The Effectiveness of
International Institutions: Hard Cases and Critical Variables, in GOVERNANCE WITHOUT
GOVERNMENT: ORDER AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS 160 (James N. Rosenau & Ernst-
Otto Czempiel eds., 1992); Robert M . Axelrod, An Evolutionary Approach to Norms, 80
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1095 (1986).
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international institutions. Even modern politico-legal realists suggest
that international law is nothing more than "an endogenous outgrowth
of individual state interests," that international law can never constrain
those interests, and that international laws change as the interests of
states change.81 Under this view international law, therefore, has a
very limited operational role, and it promotes limited cooperation when
states' interests make cooperation among states desirable. 82 However,
Kal Raustiala criticizes this politico-legalist view, noting an enormous
growth in the number of international agreements and institutions in
the post-war era as evidence that international law has not been
dismissed. 83 If these international laws and institutions do not have
any roles, he asks, why are states continuing to invest their economic
and political resources in creating them? 84  He also argues that
credibility, reputation, the inherent market system, and the
delegational nature of international law strengthen the role of
international law. 85
Other scholars justify the use of international relations theory in
international law as a diagnostic and policy-perspective tool to address
international terrorism and other international issues.86 Although all
these efforts to reconcile international relations theory and
international law are absolutely apprehensible, they miss a substantial
point: the root of international law is derived from a realist approach
and all other approaches (constructivism, liberalism, neo-liberalism,
institutionalism) are parts of the realist approach. Because all these
approaches of international relations theory make international law
serve the interests of power in a complex international system of
behaviors, less powerful countries struggle to resist the power of
dominant countries. First, less powerful countries perceive that
81. Kal Raustiala, Refining the Limits of International Law, 34 GA. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 423, 423 (2006).
82. Id. (citing JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2005)).
83. Id. at 426.
84. Id. at 429.
85. Id. at 430-33.
86. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Andrew S. Tulumello, & Stepan Wood, International
Law And International Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary
Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 367, 369, 373-74 (1998). The authors have analyzed the
use of an interdisciplinary approach to international law and international relations and
have used international relations theory in the development of international law. Id. at
373-74. They argue that international relations theory is valuable in identifying and
resolving international terrorism. Id. at 374. The authors have identified six approaches
for both international relations theory and international law to make a collaborative
research agenda, which are: regime design, process design, basis of shared norms and the
role of power, historical and cultural constitutive structures of international affairs,
government networks within state regimes, and domestically embedded international
institutions (embedded institutionalism). Id. at 369.
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international laws are generally made to enforce the hegemony of
power 7 and second, they make efforts to negotiate to reduce the
influence of power and achieve justice by using existing international
legal instruments and institutions. Most international legal scholarship
is confined to the second aspect rather than addressing how powerful
states create, interpret, and employ international law to maintain the
power status quo.8 8
There are other scholars who have addressed the fundamental
issues of how international law is either abused or dismissed by power,
and international law has come to resemble the 19th century imperial
international law. 8 9 International law as reflected in the UN structure
can be justified on the grounds that because the Security Council's
purpose is rendering order and justice, it can act in furtherance of that
purpose to solve any problem when the Council's five permanent
members find a solution politically feasible. 90 Otherwise, international
law becomes little more than an object to be manipulated by realists in
a political theatre. Other than a few international legal scholars who
explore the roots of international law, scholars pursue the argument
that the development of international law took place within the
evolution of international relations theories. 91 Therefore, there is a
tendency of international legal scholars not only to admit the
importance of international relations theory but also treat it as a
primary discipline and international law as a secondary discipline.
The foreign policy of the United States as reflected in its
international behavior appears to be based on the realist approach of
international relations theory rather than international law. After the
9/11 event, the (dis)recognition of the role of international law in
addressing the global problem of terrorism has been prevalent in U.S.
foreign policy (as prescribed by realist theory). 92 This prevalence has
87. Acharya, War on Terror, supra note 24, at 658-59 (describing how 13
international treaties created to address terrorism were agreed to before 9/11 without the
treaties or the parties having an acceptable definition of terrorism).
88. Upendra Acharya, Is Development a Lost Paradise? Trade, Environment, and
Development: A Triadic Dream of International Law, 45 ALBERTA L. REV. 401, 403 (2007).
89. Antony Anghie, Rethinking Sovereignty in International Law, 5 ANN. REV. L. &
Soc. Sci. 291, 291 (2009).
90. Martti Koskenniemi, The Police in the Temple: Order, Justice and the UN: A
Dialectical View, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L. 325, 327 (1995), available at http://www.ejil.org/
pdfs/6/1/1299.pdf.
91. Joyner, supra note 70, at 249-50.
92. U.S. foreign policy is well presented in The National Security Strategy of the
United States of America (NSS) as prescribed in 2002 and in 2006. President George
Bush, The National Security Strategy (2002), available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/; President George Bush, The National Security
Strategy (2006), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2006/.
The NSS is important for two aspects in international law, first, preventive use of force is
legal when it is used against rogue states, and second, liberal democratic countries (here
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not only posed questions regarding the behavior (rule of law) of states
and non-state actors concerning terrorism, value (equality) among
nations and peoples of the world, and democracy (process and
transparency) in the governance system of the modern-day world, but
also has downgraded the status of U.S. foreign policy and its insistence
on unilateral international behavior. 93 This declining opinion of U.S.
foreign policy may be credited to the U.S. disregard of international law
and its sole reliance on the realist approach. International legal
scholars have further contributed to this negative perception by
justifying the realist approach mirrored in U.S. foreign policy within
the framework of existing international law. 94 If this is the case, then
international legal scholars have promoted a power politics agenda and
have been oblivious to important legal aspects prescribed by the UN
Charter and other international laws, such as human rights law and
humanitarian law (limited human rights of civilians in the war zone,
treatment of captured detainees, irregular rendition, indefinite
detention without charge, and death of civilians). The use of self-
defense measures, particularly through unmanned drone attacks, is one
example of U.S. foreign policy that undermines the basic tenets of the
laws of war. Drone attacks do not allow opponents to participate in the
the US) can and should take responsibility in maintaining international order and
international peace and security against the threat of terrorism, not rely on international
law and institutions. Anghie, supra note 89, at 292. The United States adopted the self-
defense measures under Article 51 rather than collective security measures under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Many legal scholars have recognized the US adoption of
self-defense measures while recognizing the problem of terrorism is global and poses a
threat to international peace and security. See Id. at 293-94. If the problem of terrorism
is a global one and poses a threat to international peace and security, it must be dealt
with by adopting the collective security measures. Because the operational role of
international law is undermined there has not been tendency to distinguish self-defense
measures from collective security measures as to when each should be applied. This non-
distinction is credited to the realist approach in its foreign policy and submission of
international legal scholars to this approach. The perception that the United States can
demonstrate its power in keeping and maintaining international law and order by
adopting self-defense measures in order to deal with the global war on terror has caused
undue human, economic, and political (long-run) burdens.
93. See Anghie, supra note 89, at 291-307 (arguing that President Bush invoked
nineteenth century principles of international law and that his foreign policy is dominated
by the realist approach); see also CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF
FORCE (3d ed. 2008) (arguing that international law on the use of force after 9/11 is more
speculative than ever before); see also Kaufman, supra note 69, at 29 (discussing Hans
Morgenthau); see also GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 82, at 225-26. Both Morgenthau
and Goldsmith are lawyers by training who argue that international law is useful if it
corresponds with the interests of powerful states.
94. See John Yoo, Using Force, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 729, 732 (2004). The author argues
that it is naive to rely on international law and international institutions for international
peace and security and self-preservation due to the lack of effectiveness of international
law and institutions.
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conduct of war in the same way that terrorist attacks do not give
opportunity to the attacked party to fight back. 95
The void of collective security measures and the adoption of self-
defense measures in the global problem of terrorism have led to a tacit
competition between the terrorists and the United States, and may
have created a cycle of perpetual war. Therefore, perhaps the solution
to the problem of terrorism has been lingering particularly since the
9/11 event and may continue to linger, which could result in a situation
where politics (power) can have unfettered discretion to abort law
(justice) on both sides of the war of terror - one, giving rise to terrorist
groups and invisible networks of those groups, and, two, giving rise to
short-term, national-interest driven political tactics to suppress the
problem. If power politics is the principle to resolve international
problems, then both sides politicized international law. The launchers
of terrorist activities argue that their actions are not the cause but the
effect of domination and dehumanization, and suppressors of terrorist
activities argue that security within their territory and global peace and
security are of the supreme primacy with or without international legal
guidance. 96 In this scenario, if international law is employed, it will be
used only to justify the interests of power.
CONCLUSION
With the analysis made above, we can arguably come to the
conclusion that there are two approaches to address the problem of
terrorism - first, the legal approach and second, the political approach.
Both approaches have been utilized to address terrorism because the
legal approach has a minimal role within the scope of the realist theory,
where power politics is the primary element in addressing the problem
of terrorism and where law and legal elements have a limited
supporting role, being applied only when they serve the interests of
power. The global war on terror from Afghanistan to Iraq, Pakistan,
Yemen, and Somalia, and its techniques - indefinite detention,
irregular rendition, torture, and detention without charges - have
killed international law. 97 The cause of death was that, historically,
95. Paul F. M. Zahl, et al., Drones: Is It Wrong to Kill by Remote Control?,
CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Aug. 2011 at 64.
96. Joe Devanny, Justifying Terrorism, IDEA: INTERNATIONAL DEBATE EDUCATION
AssOCIATION (Feb. 21, 2011), http://www.idebate.org/debatabase/topic-details.php?topic
ID=309.
97. See Thomas M. Franck, The Use of Force in International Law, 11 TUL. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 7, 17 (2003). The author has expressed his doubt about the core principle of
international law regarding the use of force in his earlier article too. Thomas M. Franck,
Who Killed Article 2(4)? Or Changing Norms Governing the Use of Force by States, 64 AM.
J. INT'L L. 809, 809-10 (1970). See also Nanda, "War on Terror," supra note 11, at 514;
Sadat, supra note 43, at 545. Both authors have analyzed how the US has violated several
aspects of international law in their respective articles.
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international law was not believed to produce a legal solution to
international problems, including terrorism. The role of international
law is within the domain of international relations theory. It has been
used for ex post facto justification of political decisions for the purpose of
serving national interests and power politics. 98 This is the very reason
why international governance and institutional processes under the UN
structure lack democratic methods. Therefore, the existing system of
international governance does not have complete faith in democracy
and rule of law. 99 On the one hand, it neither supports a formal
majority ruling nor establishes a process for governance by majority.
On the other, treaties related to terrorism are designed to exclude
terrorist activities conducted by powerful nations. International politics
either dictates that weaker nations submit their loyalty to powerful
nations or confront the consequences, or requires nations to cooperate
when the interests are shared. This way, international law and
institutions confirm that powerful nations' activities are legitimate and
civilized. 100 It does carry some value (peace, security, equality, justice
etc.) in its linguistic formality, but does not really bother with the
question of whether those values can be achieved. When these
conditions remain intact regarding the application of international law,
the world is not as safe as we hope it to be. If United States foreign
policy dealing with the problem of terrorism continues disregarding the
principles of international law, basing its policy on international
relations theory (the realist approach) and if American international
legal scholars continue to embrace the approach that international law
is a subsystem in a broader system of a realist approach of
international relations theory, neither the problem of terrorism is
resolved nor will U.S. foreign policy be uplifted. The 21st century may
well become a post-American world where the United States will lose its
appetite for global leadership. The international power dynamics is a
zero-sum game (contrary to what Obama stated during his first visit to
98. Kaufman, supra note 69, at 28.
99. GERRY J. SIMPSON, GREAT POWERS AND OUTLAW STATES 165-93 (2004). The
author suggests that the great powers were focused on maintaining power privilege
during the creation of the UN Charter and they were successful in taking the policing
power in international affairs by pushing their hegemony over less-powerful countries.
This way the great powers legalized a class division between powerful and powerless
countries through the UN Charter.
100. See Eyal Benvensti, The US and the Use of Force: Double-edged Hegemony and
the Management of Global Emergencies, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 677, 694 (2004) (arguing that
formal inequality among nations is an essential part of international law, and the
international law bows to military and economic power to accommodate needs and to
maintain coherence).
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China)101 if it is exercised without reference to the standards of
international rule of law. Even a prominent advocate of the modern
realist school, Hans Morgenthau, at the Hoffmann's Seminar on
American Foreign Policy admitted that "power politics as a principle for
the conduct of international relations has become fatally defective and
could ultimately result in the destruction of the human race through a
suicidal . . . [w]ar." 102 Therefore, it is important for U.S. foreign policy to
respect the international rule of law and democratic process in the
international system of governance. The United States has a greater
opportunity and responsibility than any other nation to promote the
international rule of law and the virtues thereof in its foreign policy by
respecting international law, complying with it, and making it the
standard for international relations. The exercise of power without
regard to international law and the conduct of war as a manifestation of
power will neither resolve the problem of terrorism nor serve the
interests of the United States' foreign policy. It will only help establish
(and has already created) a never-ending process of war on (or of)
terror.
101. President Obama during his first visit to China, said, "Power does not need to be
a zero-sum game, and nations need not fear the success of another... .We welcome China's
efforts to play a greater role on the world stage." See Rachman, supra note 56.
102. See Boyle, supra note 66, at 217.
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